Introduction
In Asgain Co Ltd v Cheng Ka Yam ([2018] HKEC 889, CA) Asgain assigned land to CKM and CKY as tenants in common in equal shares. CKM was Asgain’s sole shareholder.
The consideration for the transfer was HK$1.5 million. The memorandum of agreement and the transfer each contained a clause acknowledging Asgain’s receipt of the purchase price.
In fact, however, no payment was made to Asgain at the time of the assignment. CKY subsequently made payments totalling HK$67,000 towards the purchase price.
CKY was later ordered to pay Asgain HK$683,000 (the outstanding balance of her share of the purchase price). She appealed arguing:
(i) that the receipt clauses gave rise to a contractual estoppel in favour of CKY; and
(ii) Asgain’s claim was defeated by section 18(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance.
Contractual estoppel
Lam V-P referred to the Court of Final Appeal decision in Ming Shiu Chung v Ming Shiu Sum ((2006) 9 HKCFAR 334), that of the Privy Council in Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello ([2014] AC 436) and that in Grundt v Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd ((1937) 59 CLR 641).
Lam V-P also referred to this statement from the 4th edition of Spencer Bower, Estoppel by Representation:
‘an estoppel by convention need not involve any misleading of a representee by a representor, nor is it essential that the representee shall be shown to have believed in the assumed state of facts or law. The full facts may be known to both parties; but if, even knowing those facts to the full, they are shown to have assumed a different state of facts or law as between themselves for the purposes of a particular transaction, then a convention will be established. The claim of the party raising the estoppel is, not that he believed the assumed version of facts or law was true, but that he believed (and agreed) that it should be treated as true’ (at p.197).
Any estoppel was, however, extinguished ‘by a counter estoppel arising from the part payments by [CKY]’ (at [18]). These payments showed that her payment obligation had not been discharged by the receipt clauses. Reliance is not an element of this type of estoppel ([24]).
The contractual estoppel plea failed.
Section 18(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance
Section 18 reads:
‘A receipt for consideration in the body of an instrument shall be a sufficient discharge to the person paying the consideration and, in favour of any other person acting on the faith of the receipt, shall be sufficient evidence of payment.’
The effect of section 18(1) is that a receipt is conclusive at common law but in equity it only gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of payment. The vendor can sue, despite section 18, if there is evidence of non-payment.
Michael Lower