Introduction
In Mui So Bing v Wan Chi Sing ([2019] HKCA 1341) D1 and D2 orally agreed to sell property to P. The parties later entered into signed written agreements; these were not registered at the Land Registry.
P paid the entire purchase price in stages to D1 and D2. D1 and D2 then entered into signed written agreements to sell the same property to D3 and D4. D3 and D4 registered their agreements at the Land Registry.
At first instance, P’s claim to be entitled to the property as against D3 and D4 based on a presumed resulting trust failed. The facts did not bring the case within any category of resulting trust. There was no voluntary transfer by P nor did P provide any part of the purchase price at the time of D1 and D2’s acquisition.
P’s claim against D1 and D2 in unjust enrichment succeeded.
P appealed against the first instance decision seeking to rely instead on the common intention constructive trust or the vendor and purchaser constructive trust.
The common intention constructive trust
While a common intention constructive trust can arise in the commercial context, there was no such trust here. There was no basis for finding that D1 and D2 had agreed to hold the property on trust for P. They had agreed to sell the property to P ([25] Yuen JA).
Vendor and purchaser trust
The vendor and purchaser resulting trust only arises if specific performance is available ([27.3]). Since P had not argued for the existence of such a trust at trial, a number of facts relevant to whether specific performance would be awarded were not explored ([27.4]). It was too late for P to raise this argument on appeal.
Priority
In any event, the contract with D3 and D4 had priority over the contract with P. P had not registered and so D3 and D4 could rely on section 3(2) of the Land Registration Ordinance. Notice was irrelevant because D3 1nd D4 had duly registered ([28.4]).
Any unwritten equity that P may have had (though the Court of Appeal was clearly sceptical as to whether there was any) was subsumed by the written agreement between P and D1 / D2 ([28.3])
Importance of pleading the relevant legal consequence
The Court of Appeal was severely critical of P’s attempt to plead legal consequences (common intention constructive trust and vendor and purchaser constructive trust) for the first time on appeal:
‘As the court’s primary aim in exercising its powers is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties, and to further these objectives by actively managing cases 35 , it seems to me to be high time that consideration should be given to requiring legal representatives to plead not only material facts, but also all the legal consequences to which those facts validly lead 36 , with the effect that the parties would be barred from contending different legal consequences on appeal.’ ([23.3] per Yuen JA).
Michael Lower