Archibald v Alexander: the facts
In Archibald v Alexander ([2020] EWHC 1621) a mother and her three children (Patsy, Brenda and John) orally agreed that a house would be purchased in the name of the mother and one of the siblings. It was to be held on trust for the mother for life and then for the three children equally.
This was for tax-planning reasons and to protect the property from any claim by the mother’s husband should she re-marry. The assumption was that there was no need to take excessive care to formalise the trust given the loving family context.
The property was transferred to the mother and Patsy as joint tenants, neither Brenda nor John was available to attend the solicitor’s office at the time of the purchase.
When the mother died, there was a dispute as to whether Patsy was the sole owner of the property or held it on the terms of the oral trust.
Was there reliance?
If this was a common intention constructive trust, then Brenda and John needed to show detrimental reliance. Fancourt J. held that there was reliance: ‘the non-signing siblings were self-evidently relying on the word and promise of those who did become owners’ ([14]).
Was there detriment?
Given the finding of reliance, the detriment was the decision of Brenda and John not to take steps to legally protect their ownership interest in the house; this was a sufficient change of position ([30]).
Not a common intention constructive trust?
The findings on detrimental reliance were obiter:
‘the instant case is of a different kind, in which a property is transferred (gratuitously) into the name of the owner on the basis of their express agreement to hold the property on trust for another. The owner only obtains the property on the terms of the agreement and equity does not permit them unconscionably to refuse to give effect to the terms. The trust arises from the terms on which the property was transferred, not from detrimental reliance on the agreement by the beneficiary.’ ([32]).
The essential elements of this constructive trust are: ‘property had been transferred to a volunteer on the basis of his promise to hold it on certain terms, and would not otherwise have been so transferred’ ([37]).
Fancourt J. referred to Rochefoucauld v Boustead; Bannister v Bannister and De Bruyne v De Bruyne.
There is no need to establish detrimental reliance for constructive trusts like this.
Michael Lower